Many environmental tax systems rely on self-reported emission levels by …rms. These reports are veri…ed through costly audits by regulatory agencies, which are typically underfunded. Recently, it has been suggested that competitive audit mechanisms (CAMs) applied by underfunded agencies can improve the reporting behavior of …rms relative to a random audit mechanism when …rms'emissions are …xed. Under CAMs higher reported emissions by …rms result in a lower audit probability and vice versa. This study evaluates the performance of CAMs when …rms can choose the level of emissions as well as the level of reporting. It is shown that some types of CAMs can lead to fewer emissions and to more accurate reporting in comparison to the commonly applied random audit mechanism. However, other types of CAMs can induce more emissions caused by …rms.
Introduction
An essential component in the design of policies to protect the environment is the ability to enforce compliance. Whenever the compliance level among regulated …rms is low, the success of environmental policies is at risk. Compliance among …rms can usually be achieved through an e¤ective …ne-based enforcement system installed by environmental enforcement agencies.
The …nes for non-compliance in such a system tend to be capped. 1 Hence, the enforcement system chie ‡y relies on su¢ ciently high audit probabilities so that it successfully deters noncompliance by …rms. However, conducting audits is costly for the agencies and therefore the audit probability is determined by the agency's operating budget.
Many environmental enforcement agencies around the globe have insu¢ cient budgets to carry out the required audits and this problem is compounded by ongoing budget cuts. For example, in Canada's largest province, Ontario, the operating budget of the Ministry of the Environment (MOE) decreased by 45% since 1992/1993, while at the same time the operating budget of the Ontario government increased by 72% (ECO (2011), p.81). Currently, MOE is responsible for the inspection of at least 125,000 facilities to ensure that they are complying with all of its provincial environmental laws and regulations. However, MOE only has audit resources to conduct approximately 5,000 inspections each year and some facilities may go decades without inspections (ECO (2007), p. [23] [24] . When MOE conducts inspections at polluting facilities, high levels of non-compliance are regularly found (ECO (2007), p. [25] [26] . It follows that using the available tight audit resources more e¤ectively to improve the compliance levels among …rms is critical for underfunded enforcement agencies.
The purpose of this paper is to work towards the creation of more e¤ective audit mechanisms. While we place our analysis in the environmental …eld, the issue examined has policy-relevance for regulatory areas as diverse as tax collection, banking regulation, health and safety regulations, besides others.
In this paper, we focus on environmental regulations that rely on self-reported emission levels by …rms, such as the US Toxic Release Inventory program (TRI). The TRI requires regulated facilities to quantify and publicly report annually on certain toxic substances they release. Under information disclosure programs such as the TRI, …rms typically have to make two decisions: (1) the quantity of emissions to generate, and (2) the quantity of these emissions to report. When determining the quantity of emissions to disclose, …rms weigh the cost of disclosed emissions (tax payments or adverse market reaction by consumers or investors) versus the expected cost for undisclosed emissions. 2 The expected cost for undisclosed emissions 1 For a discussion of restrictions on the magnitude of penalties and …nes, see for example Harrington (1988) . 2 Hamilton (1995) …nds that the higher the pollution …gures were in a …rm's TRI reports, the more likely print journalists were to write about this …rm's toxic releases, which resulted in abnormal negative stock depends on the penalty and the audit probability.
It is common for environmental enforcement agencies not to disclose their audit strategy publicly, which means regulated …rms do not know how audit resources are allocated among them. For rational market participants this may lead to the belief that audit resources are allocated equally among all regulated …rms. The strategy to equally split the available audit resources between the …rms is called the random audit mechanism. This paper shows that this commonly applied random audit mechanism is not optimal in terms of the incentives it induces for abating emissions when the regulatory agency is underfunded. Thus, the optimal audit mechanism has to make use of the reports in some way. We introduce audit mechanisms that take the reports of the …rms into account when allocating the limited audit resources among …rms. We prove that these types of audit mechanisms can dominate the random audit mechanism in terms of induced incentives for emissions abatement whenever the audit budget of the enforcement agency is tight.
The purpose of this paper is closest to that of Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (2006) who also study the optimal audit policy for an enforcement agency when …rms can choose both the level of emissions and the level of reporting. They …nd that it is optimal to devote the available audit resources primarily to the easiest-to-monitor …rms and to those …rms that value pollution the least. This is because the easier it is to detect pollution, the lower the audit probability necessary to induce the desired pollution level per …rm. Likewise, having less incentives to pollute, the …rms with less gains from pollution will be more deterred by the auditing e¤orts of the agency. Our approach is complementary, but di¤erent.
Speci…cally, we focus on the incentives to reduce emissions induced by endogenous competitive audit mechanisms (CAMs) as recently introduced in Bayer and Cowell (2009) for the area of general tax compliance and Gilpatric et al. (2011) for the environmental …eld. CAMs are audit strategies that allocate more of the available audit resources to the …rm with the smaller report relative to the other …rm. The relative comparison, based on disclosed information, generates a reporting competition between regulated …rms. Gilpatric et al. (2011) show that …rms disclose higher emission levels under CAMs in comparison to the disclosure levels induced by the random audit mechanism. Because the authors focus on …rms'reporting behavior and assume emissions are exogenous, the incentives of such a mechanism for emission abatement remain unclear.
Since most environmental policies aim to control emission levels, we endogenize the choice of emissions and study how …rms decide upon both the level of emissions and their reports returns shortly after the …gures were released. Marchi and Hamilton (2006) show that in the case of air emissions in the chemical industry, the regulated plants are often deciding not to report accurate estimates of their actual air emissions.
under CAMs. We …nd that CAMs can also be applied as a bene…cial audit strategy in terms of induced emission levels. In line with Gilpatric et al. (2011) we …nd that the …rms'behavior under certain types of CAMs can lead to higher reporting levels in comparison to the random audit mechanism. We demonstrate that under these types of CAMs the e¤ective cost of emissions for a …rm increase compared to under the random audit mechanism since the …rm reports and pays taxes on a larger share of its emissions. Consequently, under these types of CAMs the …rms reduce their emissions compared to under the random audit mechanism.
However, we also show that very high levels of competition in reporting can lead to the opposite e¤ect, namely more aggregate emissions caused by …rms in comparison to the random audit mechanism.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature related to this analysis. In section three, we present the model of the …rms' decisions with respect to their emission levels as well as the emissions they report and pay tax on. The benchmark case of the random audit mechanism is analyzed in section four. Section …ve and six present and compare two di¤erent types of CAMs: the imperfectly-discriminating audit mechanism and the perfectly-discriminating audit mechanism. Finally, our conclusions are presented in section seven.
Related Literature
An increasing amount of environmental policies apply self-reporting (SR) of emission levels as a feature of enforcement. This development has been accompanied by a steadily growing economic literature, underscoring the potential that SR holds to increase compliance and e¢ ciency in comparison to the standard enforcement model without SR (e.g. Kaplow and Shavell (1994), Livernois and McKenna (1999) , and Innes (1999)). A signi…cant advantage is that regulators can focus audit resources on agents that fail to self-report violations. In order to make agents report compliance violations, they must have an incentive to do so, such as a reduced …ne for self-reported versus unreported violations (Livernois and McKenna (1999) ).
Further arguments for the usage of SR include: SR decreases the social costs of punishment (Malik (1993) ); self-reporters do not engage in costly avoidance activities (Innes (1999) ); and SR decreases environmental damages through more accurate clean-up e¤orts (Evans (2009) ).
Most of the pioneering academic work on self-reporting is in the context of tax compliance and goes back to Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Greenberg (1984) . Harford (1987) is the …rst study on the implications of self-reporting in the environmental …eld. Many subsequent papers advocated the use of dynamic enforcement mechanisms that use the information ob-tained through an audit to assign the agent's probability of future audits (Harrington (1988) , Greenberg (1984) , Heyes and Rickman (1999) , Friesen (2003) ). The basic idea is a system with two enforcement groups. Firms found to violate regulations in the current period are placed in an enforcement group with tougher sanctions in the next period. Typically, it is shown that …rms that do not have incentives to comply under undi¤erentiated sanctioning and audit rates can be induced to comply under the di¤erentiated system. The reason is that …rms in the tougher sanctions group have an additional incentive to comply with regulations, namely the reward of being transferred to the lower sanction group next period. Therefore, the past compliance history of …rms can be used as a basis for allocating audit resources that lead to more e¤ective audit decisions in comparison to a random allocation of audit resources among the …rms. As previously outlined, other factors besides the past history of …rms can be used as a basis for allocating audit resources. Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (2006) …nd that it is advisable for regulatory enforcement agencies to devote the available audit resources primarily to the easiest-to-monitor …rms and to those …rms that least value pollution.
Very recently, it was suggested that static competitive audit mechanisms based on relative evaluation of …rms' reports can generate strong incentives for compliance. In terms of the general tax-compliance context, Bayer and Cowell (2009) concentrate on corporate tax-evasion and market decisions in an oligopolistic setting. In their model, …rms face a relative audit rule wherein the probability of audit of a particular …rm depends on a …rm's report relative to others operating in the same market. They …nd that a competitive audit rule can improve …rms'reporting behavior as well as its e¢ ciency on the market. 3 In the environmental …eld, Gilpatric et. al (2011) develop endogenous audit mechanisms that use relative comparisons based on disclosed information to generate a compliance competition between …rms. They …nd that these mechanisms have advantages in terms of reporting in comparison to the random audit mechanism. The authors assume emissions to be exogenous to the …rms and also that the enforcement agency has some noisy information about the …rms' level of emission. In contrast, the paper at hand endogenizes the choice of emissions and studies how …rms decide upon both the level of emissions and their reports when the level of emissions is completely unobservable to the agency.
The mechanism design literature also …nds solutions to truth-telling problems in the environmental …eld. An overview of this literature is set out in Baliga and Maskin (2003) . Duggan and Roberts (2002) construct a mechanism that can implement the …rst best emission level in an environmental compliance setup by designing incentives for …rms to monitor one another and to report on each other's emission levels. Thus, purely as a theoretical exercise, the decentralized compliance problem has been solved. However, for the mechanism to work, the regulator needs to commit to o¤-equilibrium actions that punish …rms for not telling the true emission levels of their competitors. In reality, however, most legal systems hold …rms solely responsible for their own actions. The proposed mechanism in this paper holds …rms responsible for their own actions only and thereby presents an alternative approach to improve the compliance behavior of …rms that is in line with most legal systems. In addition, Duggan and Roberts (2002) assume that the regulator can observe emissions caused by …rms, but does not know the …rm's type in the form of its abatement cost function. In contrast, the model in this paper allows for two layers of asymmetric information: the regulator can neither observe …rms'bene…t function from causing emissions (hidden information) nor the emissions caused by …rms (hidden action).
Model and Preliminaries
This section introduces the model that we apply in order to study the incentives induced by
CAMs on …rms'behavior in terms of abating and reporting emissions. 4 We consider n …rms in a particular industry to decide on their level of emissions e i , where
The bene…ts a …rm accrues from causing emissions are captured by a bene…t function g i (e i ) that is assumed to be increasing and concave: g 0 i (e i ) > 0 and g 00 i (e i ) < 0 for e i 2 [0; E): In addition we assume that g 0 i (E) = 0, and g 0 i (e i ) < 0 for e i 2 (E; 1): 5 Hence, in the absence of regulation, …rms would choose the maximum emission level that bene…ts their operating process, i.e. e i = E: The bene…t function is known to the …rms, but unknown to the regulator. 6 In order to control for aggregate emission levels, the government introduces a constant per-unit tax, denoted t; for each unit of emissions. The emission level under full-compliance,
i , is implicitly de…ned by g 0 i (e f c i ) = t, i.e. …rm i adjusts its marginal bene…ts from causing emissions to the marginal costs of emissions: the tax rate. The tax is assumed to be low 4 The model re ‡ects a typical environmental tax compliance setup similar to the ones found in Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (2006) or Evans (2009). 5 The bene…t function g(e) is a pro…t function (:) that is maximized with respect to all input factors (other than emissions) represented through vector x, i.e. g(e) = M ax x (x; e) = (x (e); e); where x (e) is the vector of optimal quantities of each input depending solely on emissions, e: Hence, a lower e can result from a lower production level as well as from higher abatement e¤orts by the …rm. When we talk about the abatement of emissions in this paper, we refer to a lower level of e regardless of how this reduction is achieved by the …rm. 6 It is typically believed that …rms are more informed about each other's production process in comparison to the regulator. For tractability, we assume that g(e) is common knowledge among the …rms, but unknown to the regulator. Varian (1994) for example assumes the same information structure. enough to increase welfare, in case of full compliance by the …rms. 7 The government directs an agency to enforce this tax system and provides the operating budget which includes the budget to conduct audits.
The objective of the enforcement agency is to bring …rms'emissions as close as possible to the emission level under full-compliance given its audit budget and the pro…t-maximizing behavior of …rms. One complicating factor for the agency is that it cannot directly observe the emissions caused by …rms. Instead, the agency relies on the self-reported emission levels r i by …rms, where r i 0. The agency can audit the …rms in order to verify the reports.
These audits are assumed to be error-free. Since conducting audits is costly for the agency, it is constrained by its audit budget. The audit budget allows the agency to audit q …rms out of the n …rms in the industry. Hence, q n is the probability that one …rm is audited if the agency decides to split the audit resources equally between all …rms in the industry. This audit strategy is called the random audit mechanism and it will serve as our benchmark. The audit probability is denoted by , i.e. = q n under the random audit mechanism.
Alternatively, the agency may apply an audit mechanism that targets some …rms with higher audit probabilities then others. Let …rm i be a targeted …rm, then i = q n i , where is exogenously determined by the available resources to conduct audits; the second factor i re ‡ects the audit mechanism applied by the agency. Note, that the random audit mechanism arises as a special case when the agency sets i = 1, for i = 1; 2; :::; n: Clearly, if the agency sets > 1 for some …rms, it needs to decrease the audit probabilities of other …rms in order to keep the audit budget balanced. For example, to …nance the increased audit probability of …rm i, when i 2 [1; 2], the agency could reduce the audit probability of …rm j, such that j = q n (2 i ): Our goal is to analyze the induced incentives by CAMs that allocate the available audit resources based on the comparison of …rms'reports. In order to implement CAMs within the regulated industry sector, the agency needs to match …rms of equal size (this information is publicly available from the balance sheets of the …rms). 8 We analyze the situation when the 7 The level of welfare consists of aggregate …rms'pro…ts reduced by the damages to the environment caused by …rms'emissions and by the costs of enforcement. Hence, if the tax was too large, non-compliance by …rms might be welfare-improving. Our assumption excludes these cases. A further implication of our assumption of a low tax rate is that …rms'pro…ts under full-compliance are positive, i.e. g i (e f c i ) te f c i > 0: 8 The process of collecting observable characteristics of subjects (such as their sizes) is called pro…ling. Pro…ling is a feature of sophisticated audit mechanisms applied by some enforcement agencies. In this process, subjects of similar pro…les are matched and their reports are compared by the agency. For example, Australia's tax authority estimates the tax evasion potential of small …rms through a computer-based scoring system that evaluates the evasion potential of a …rm based on a comparison of that …rm to other declarations given by …rms sharing the same pro…le (Australian Taxation O¢ ce (2008) found in Bayer and Cowell (2009), footnote 9). Our approach re ‡ects the attempt to model this process in an environmental compliance context. agency pairs equal-size …rms within the same industry sector. These two …rms are assumed to be identical in the way they bene…t from causing emissions.
To keep the notation as simple as possible, we set the audit probability for each of the two …rms under the random audit mechanism to q n = 2 and the factor re ‡ecting the audit mechanism to i = 2p i : Resulting, p i 2 [0; 1] is the probability that …rm i is audited. The …rst factor, , is exogenously determined by the available audit resources; the second factor, p i , is endogenously determined through the audit mechanism applied by the agency, in such a way that the audit probability is always in the unit interval (explained below). According to the logic of CAMs, p i may depend on …rms'reports such that p i = p i (r i ; r j ):
The agency can levy a constant per-unit penalty, denoted , for each unit of unreported emissions that are detected by the agency, where > t: Since, the penalty and the tax rate t are assumed to be linear, the agency recognizes that it is optimal for the …rm to truthfully report all of its emissions if the expected penalty for under-reported emissions is higher than the tax-rate on reported emissions, i.e. if p i (r i ; r j ) t then r i = e i : 9 In this case, the …rm fully complies with the environmental tax system, which means that the emission level of the …rm is e f c and cannot be improved upon. Hence, optimal behavior of the agency is such that it would never spend more resources on auditing than what is required to induce truthful reporting for a …rm, i.e.
If the audit probability p i (r i ; r j ) reaches a level of t= for …rm i, it is natural that the agency automatically allocates the remaining audit resources towards …rm j, i.e. if p i (r i ; r j ) = t= , then p j (r i ; r j ) = t= . The situation that the audit probability p i (r i ; r j ) reaches a level of t= for …rm i is only possible if the audit resources are su¢ ciently high, which may or may not be the case. In concluding, we can de…ne the boundaries of
where p = maxf0; 1 t=( )g and p = minft=( ); 1g: These boundaries guarantee that the audit probability p i (r i ; r j ) is always in the unit interval.
Given our assumptions, the objective of …rm i is to choose a level of emissions e i and a report r i to maximize its expected pro…t:
Choosing r i > e i is never optimal for the …rm, because reporting higher emissions than what is actually released is not rewarded by the agency and the …rm would therefore be paying higher taxes than necessary. Since r i > e i is never optimal, it follows that r i e i in 9 If p i (r i ; r j ) = t; …rm i is indi¤erent about which report to choose, because the costs of emissions are identical for any r i 2 [0; e i ]. We impose the assumption that it chooses r i = e i in this case. While this assumption simpli…es the analysis, it does not in ‡uence the emissions choices of the …rms in equilibrium. This is because for the choice of emissions, only the costs of emissions are relevant.
any equilibrium. Thus, we can replace the expression maxfe i r i ; 0g in (1) with [e i r i ], for
The expected pro…t function in (1) can be simpli…ed to:
where p i (r i ; r j ) 2 [0; 1] is the audit probability of …rm i.
In order to achieve its objective, the enforcement agency can choose between audit strategies that may utilize the information in …rms' reports. Our goal is to compare three audit regimes that can be announced by the agency: (1) the random audit mechanism, i.e.
the available audit resources are split equally between the two …rms, regardless of their
The imperfectly-discriminating audit mechanism, i.e. the allocation of audit resources can be in ‡uenced to some degree by …rms'reports -but not completely -such that
The latter assumption ensures that the audit resources are …xed. (3) The perfectly-discriminating audit mechanism, i.e. the agency allocates the complete amount of audit resources to the …rm with the lower report and only spends audit resources on the …rm with the higher report, if it is certain that the lower-reporting …rm reports truthfully, in which case p i (r i ; r j ) = p, and
If the reports are equal, the audit resources are split equally.
One example of a functional form for p i (r i ; r j ) that allows for a comparison of the induced emissions level resulting from the audit rules of interest while keeping audit resources …xed is the ratio form based on the widely-used Tullock-type function initially introduced in Tullock (1980) . This ratio captures the imperfectly-discriminating audit mechanism and it converges to the random and to the perfectly-discriminating audit mechanisms at its two limiting cases.
Accordingly, we assume that the agency determines the proportion of the audit budget spent on auditing …rm i according to the following contest success function (CSF): 10 We implement the idea of competitive auditing through the most widely studied types of CSFs in the literature: the so called logit CSF (0 < < 1) and the deterministic all-pay-auction ( ! 1). See Konrad (2007) for a comprehensive overview.
where p = maxf0; 1 t=( )g and p = minft=( ); 1g: The proportion of the audit budget allocated to …rm j is p j (r i ; r j ) = 1 p i (r i ; r j ):
Parameter determines the audit mechanism that can be announced by the agency. Specifically, this parameter controls the intensity of the reporting competition between the two …rms.
Given that the audit probability does not force either …rm into truth-telling, then any value 0 < < 1 re ‡ects the imperfectly-discriminating audit mechanism: the higher the report of …rm i, the lower the proportion of the total audit budget that is allocated to audit …rm i and vice versa. The ratio converges to the random audit mechanism if = 0, and to the perfectly-discriminating audit mechanism if ! 1:
In order to prove the principle that the imperfectly-discriminating audit mechanism can dominate both, the random audit mechanism and the perfectly-discriminating audit mechanism, it is su¢ cient to analyze the case when = 1: To clarify, assuming a speci…c functional form for p i (r i ; r j ) and evaluating it at = 1 merely re ‡ects one special case of the imperfectlydiscriminating audit mechanism. However, we will show that even this restrictive version of the imperfectly-discriminating audit mechanism can lead to lower emission levels in comparison to the other two audit mechanisms. Hence, there has to exist an unrestricted version of the imperfectly-discriminating audit mechanism that leads to at least equally low emission levels and hence dominates the random audit mechanism and the perfectly-discriminating audit mechanism.
After the agency has announced the audit mechanism, the timing of the game is as follows:
In stage one of the game, both …rms observe parameter and make simultaneous decisions about their emission level: e i and e j , which are observed by both …rms.
In stage two of the game, both …rms make simultaneous decisions about their report to the agency: r i and r j :
The solution concept applied is the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE). The game is solved by way of backwards induction focussing attention on symmetric equilibria. 11 
Random Audit Mechanism
This section outlines the SPNE of the game in terms of emissions and reporting per …rm when the agency decides to announce the random audit mechanism (i.e. = 0 in the contest success function (3)). It is commonly believed that the random audit mechanism is the typical audit strategy of enforcement agencies (Gilpatric et. al (2011) 
Stage 2: The Reporting Equilibrium
Under the random audit mechanism, the available audit resources are split equally between the two …rms, i.e. p i (r i ; r j ) = 1=2, regardless of their reports. Hence, the audit probability is =2 for both …rms. Having chosen emission level e i at stage 1 of the game …rm i has to decide about r i in order to maximize its expected pro…t at stage 2 of the game:
The …rst-order condition (FOC) determines …rm i's optimal reporting choice:
The optimal reporting choice for …rm i depends on the level of audit budget, the tax rate and the penalty and is independent of the other …rm's report. If the marginal cost of reporting and paying emission taxes is higher than the expected marginal cost of under-reporting, the …rm will report to have caused zero emissions at stage 1 of the game, otherwise it will report its emissions truthfully.
Before we proceed, it is useful to de…ne B = t , where B is the "standardized"funding level of the agency. We consider three standardized levels of funding of the agency: (1) full funding, i.e. B 2 (which implies 2 t). Full funding of the agency means that its audit budget is high enough to allow for audit probabilities to induce truthful reporting for both …rms with the random audit mechanism. Clearly, this outcome could not be improved upon. Instead, the main focus of this paper is on the behavior of the …rm when the agency is underfunded, i.e.
B < 2 (which implies 2 < t). An underfunded agency cannot implement truthful reporting for both …rms with the random audit mechanism, because the available audit budget results in audit probabilities that are too low. We di¤erentiate further into two levels of underfunding:
(2) moderate underfunding, i.e. 1 < B < 2; and (3) severe underfunding, i.e. 0 < B 1. 
Stage 1: The Emissions Equilibrium
In stage 1 of the game, …rms choose emissions in order to maximize expected pro…ts taking into account the reporting equilibrium (r i ) at stage 2 of the game. The expected pro…t of …rm i is:
The FOC leads to the optimal choice of emissions for …rm i to be implicitly de…ned by:
The …rm adjusts the marginal bene…ts from causing emissions to the marginal expected penalties if audit resources are su¢ ciently low or according to the tax rate otherwise. We denote this equilibrium choice of emissions by e r . When 0 < 2 < t (or B 2 (0; 2)); it follows that e r > e f c , i.e. emissions are higher than the full-compliance emissions level, when the agency is underfunded. This concludes the presentation of the benchmark case. Do audit strategies based on competitive reporting have the ability to improve upon the outcome in the benchmark case, if the agency is underfunded (B < 2)? The following analysis o¤ers some insights.
Imperfectly-discriminating Audit Mechanism
This section outlines the symmetric equilibrium of the game in terms of emissions and reporting of …rms when the agency announces a particular form of the imperfect-discriminating audit mechanism. This audit mechanism is also referred to as the Tullock audit mechanism in this paper, and it evolves from setting = 1 in the contest success function (3). Again, the game is solved by backwards induction: …rst by analyzing stage 2, and second by analyzing stage 1.
Stage 2: The Reporting Equilibrium
At stage 2 of the game, the two …rms choose their emission-reports, r 1 and r 2 , to maximize their expected payo¤s. They treat all other variables as exogenous particularly their actual emission level, e 1 and e 2 , which have been chosen at stage 1 of the game. Hence, the problem of …rm 1 at stage 2 is to choose a report maximizing its expected payo¤s given the report of …rm 2. The following expected pro…t function of …rm 1 is valid in the case when …rms'reports are su¢ ciently similar to each other, such that the audit mechanism is within its boundaries for both …rms, i.e. p i 2 (p; p), for i = 1; 2 :
Firm 1 chooses its report r 1 given r 2 and the funding situation of the agency B in order to maximize its expected pro…ts stated in (8) . The FOC,
= 0, can be written as: 
The remaining cases, i.e. when the reports are su¢ ciently di¤erent from one another, such that p i = 2 (p; p) for both …rms, are addressed algebraically in Appendix A. Figure ( 2) represents the complete BRs graphically when the agency is moderately underfunded (B 2 (1; 2)) with the report of …rm 1 on the vertical axis and the report of …rm 2 on the horizontal axis. When …rms'reports are relatively similar the audit mechanism is such that p i 2 (p; p) for both …rms, which is the situation within the white cone shown in the …gure. In this case, the BR1 is described by (10) and neither …rm reports truthfully.
When …rms'reports are relatively di¤erent from one another the audit mechanism is such 12 The second-order condition,
holds as it is:
2 (p; p) for both …rms, i.e. the lower-reporting …rm is induced to truthfully report its emissions. For example, if r 1 is su¢ ciently lower than r 2 , the audit mechanism determines the audit probability of …rm 1 to be high enough to induce …rm 1 to truthfully report (p 1 = p and p 2 = p): Hence, any point (r 1 ; r 2 ) within the grey-shaded triangle to the "south-east" of the white cone leads …rm 1 to truthfully report. If …rm 1 truthfully reports, the best response of …rm 2 is to place its report along the lower boundary of the white cone. To report along this boundary guarantees the lowest audit probability possible for …rm 2 (p 2 = p), while a higher r 2 would lead to higher tax payments without further lowering its audit probability p 2 .
The …gure shows that the BRs coincide exactly once, de…ning a NE for any combination of e 1 and e 2 . This is also true in the case of the agency being severely underfunded (B 2 (0; 1]):
In this case the grey-shaded areas in …gure (2) do not exist, i.e. none of the …rms would ever truthfully report. The BR1 is described by (10) in that case whenever it is positive.
Since …rms are identical, we conjecture that …rms choose identical emissions at stage 1 of the game in the symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. 13 When …rms' emissions are identical at stage 1, their best responses in terms of reporting at stage 2 are identical as well.
Hence, the symmetric NE of the reporting stage has to occur along the 45 line. Whenever the BRs cross the 45 line, it is r 1 = r 2 and the BRs for both …rms take on the form: 14 r 1 (e 1 ; r 2 ; B) = p Br 2 (r 2 + e 1 ) r 2 ; and r 2 (e 2 ; r 1 ; B) = p Br 1 (r 1 + e 2 ) r 1 :
Setting r 1 = r 2 in either one of the equations in (11) yields the solution for the symmetric reporting equilibrium: r 1 (e; e; B) = r 2 (e; e; B) = e B 4 B ; for B 2 (0; 2):
We can learn from (12) that if the agency is close to full funding (B approaches 2 from below), truthful reporting occurs in equilibrium (r i (e; e; B) approaches e from below for i = 1; 2).
As long as the agency is underfunded (B 2 (0; 2)) the reporting in the symmetric equilibrium is not truthful, i.e. r i 2 (0; e i ) for i = 1; 2: It is straight forward to see that the equilibrium level of reporting under a Tullock audit mechanism is higher in the symmetric equilibrium in comparison to the level of reporting under the random audit mechanism, i.e. e In
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We …nd these values near equilibrium (p i 2 (p; p)) by applying the implicit function theorem to the system of best responses in (11) . This system consists of two di¤erentiable functions that describe the solution for the two endogenous variables r 1 and r 2 depending on emissions e 1 and e 2 : Re-arranging the two best responses in system (11) yields:
The total di¤erentiation of system (13) leads to the following matrix:
In order to solve for the partial derivatives of r 1 and r 2 with respect to e 1 and e 2 , we require that the determinant jDj of the matrix on the left hand side of system (14) has to be nonsingular, i.e. di¤erent from zero, which is shown below. The value of jDj is given by:
Applying Cramer's rule to the matrix system in (14) leads to the partial derivatives of interest:
In order to …nd the signs of the two partial derivatives stated in (16) and (17), let us consider an increase in e 1 : The BR1 is increasing in e 1 (if p i 2 (p; p)) which is straight forward to see from 15 We set r 1 (e 1 ; e 2 ; B) = r 1 and r 2 (e 1 ; e 2 ; B) = r 2 in the following.
(10). The BR2 does not change in e 1 . Hence, as the BR1 increases, the reporting equilibrium moves "north" along the best response function of …rm 2 (compare …gure (2)). Hence, the equilibrium-reporting choice of …rm 1 is always increasing in its own level of emissions e 1 : As a result (16) has to be positive, which is only possible if jDj is positive as well, i.e. jDj cannot be singular. The cross e¤ect of a change of emissions of …rm 2 on the equilibrium-reporting choice of …rm 1 expressed in (17) is ambiguous, as it depends on the sign of r 2 (2B 2) + Be 1 2r 1 or B(2r 2 + e 1 ) 2(r 1 + r 2 ):
In conclusion, this section determined the value of the reporting equilibrium r 1 and r 2 when emissions are identical as well as the …rst partial derivatives of the reporting equilibrium of …rm 1 and …rm 2 with respect to e 1 and e 2 . 16 This insight is su¢ cient to solve for the optimal emission choices of …rm 1 and …rm 2 at stage 1.
Stage 1: The Emissions Equilibrium
At stage 1 of the game, …rms choose simultaneously their emission levels e 1 and e 2 in order to maximize their expected pro…ts. At the NE of this subgame, …rms choose their emissions as a best response to the emissions of the other …rm, anticipating how both emission choices spill over into the reporting equilibrium at stage 2 (r 1 and r 2 ). If the audit mechanism is such that p i 2 (p; p), …rm 1 chooses emissions in order to maximize the following expected pro…t function:
The FOC of …rm 1 can be stated as: 
The value of the FOC (19) at e 1 = e 2 can be found by substituting (12) , (15), (16), and (17):
The emission level that is implicitly de…ned by (20) is the equilibrium candidate for a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies under the Tullock audit mechanism. We denote this 16 The partial derivatives for the cases when p i = 2 (p; p) are stated in the Appendix.
emission level by e t : This equilibrium candidate so far merely satis…es a necessary condition for a symmetric equilibrium. In Appendix A we derive and precisely state a su¢ cient condition that guarantees the existence of e t as the symmetric SPNE in pure strategies. Roughly speaking, this su¢ cient condition states that g 0 (e) has to be steep, i.e. the marginal bene…ts of causing emissions have to decline fast enough in e in order for the symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies to exist. A wide range of bene…t functions g(e) ful…ll this su¢ cient condition.
Comparing the emission levels under the random audit mechanism and under the Tullock audit mechanism leads to the next Proposition:
Proposition 2 Given that the symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies exists (as per su¢ -cient conditions stated above), emissions per …rm are always lower under the Tullock audit mechanism in comparison to the random audit mechanism whenever the agency is underfunded (B 2 (0; 2)):
Proof. The incentives for causing emissions that are induced by the random audit mechanism and the Tullock audit mechanism can be compared by comparing the marginal costs (M C)
faced by …rms when making its choices for emissions under both regimes. The emission level under the random audit mechanism is implicitly de…ned by (7), which can be rearranged to g 0 (e r )=( ) = 1=2 when the agency is underfunded. Let M C=( ) be the "e¤ective" M C.
Hence, the e¤ective M C under the random audit mechanism is 1=2: In order to show that the Tullock audit mechanism exposes …rms to higher e¤ective MC than the random audit mechanism, we need to show that the right hand side of equation (20) is higher than 1=2, i.e.:
E¤ective MC (random audit mechanism) < E¤ective MC (Tullock audit mechanism) 1 2
Inequality (21) is equivalent to B < 2: Hence, the Tullock audit mechanism causes higher e¤ective marginal costs for …rms when creating emissions whenever the agency is underfunded, i.e. B 2 (0; 2). Higher e¤ective marginal costs of emissions lead to a lower emission level created by …rms, since g(:) is concave in e.
The Tullock audit mechanism induces …rms to compete in terms of reporting in the second stage of the audit-game resulting in higher reports compared to their reporting choices under the random audit mechanism. Since the two …rms report the same emissions at the symmetric reporting equilibrium, the audit probability is not changed in comparison to the random audit regime -it is still =2: When …rms make a decision about the amount of emissions to create during the emission process at stage 1, they take the higher disclosure rates and subsequent higher tax payments into account. Since the …rms know that they are going to report and pay tax on a larger share of their emissions than they would under the random audit mechanism, the e¤ective cost of emissions has been increased. Therefore, the …rms reduce their emissions. 17 Figure (3) illustrates the induced emissions and reporting levels under the random audit mechanism and under the Tullock audit mechanism.
6 Discussion: Perfectly-discriminating Audit Mechanism
In this section we discuss the induced incentives for …rms' emission behavior under the perfectly-discriminating audit mechanism. For the complete formal characterization of the 17 The analysis focuses on equal-size …rms within the same industry that are assumed to have identical bene…t functions from causing emissions. However, in reality …rms may not be exactly identical. As can be seen from (19) , the best emissions response of …rm 1 is continuous in the …rm's characteristic, i.e. how …rm 1 bene…ts from causing emissions (g 1 (e 1 )). Hence, small changes in the bene…t function of …rm 1 only cause small changes in the BR1. Therefore, the result stated in Proposition 2 also holds true when …rms are not exactly identical, but have slightly di¤erent bene…t functions. symmetric equilibrium of the perfectly-discriminating audit mechanism refer to Appendix B.
The perfectly-discriminating audit mechanism results when the regulatory agency announces the competitive parameter to be in…nitely large ( ! 1) in the contest success function de…ned in (3) . Under this audit rule, the agency will allocate the complete amount of audit resources to the …rm with the lower report. Only if the agency can be certain that the lower-reporting …rm truthfully reports will the agency spend the remaining audit resources on the …rm with the higher report. This audit mechanism has the character of an all-pay auction, because both …rms pay taxes on their reports, but only the higher reporting …rm is "rewarded"with lenient treatment by the agency. We therefore refer to this audit mechanism as the all-pay auction audit mechanism.
Under the all-pay auction audit mechanism the only symmetric equilibrium is in mixed strategies. This means that …rms choose their emission level at stage 1 of the game according to a probability distribution function. Hence, it is most likely that …rms will have chosen di¤erent levels of emissions when entering the reporting stage 2. In which case the all-pay auction audit mechanism causes ine¢ ciencies, because it "punishes"the lower reporting …rm with high audit probabilities even if this …rm reports close to its true emission level. On the contrary, it "rewards"the higher reporting …rm with lenient treatment (low or even zero audit probabilities), even if this …rm signi…cantly underreports its emissions. As a result, the allpay auction audit mechanism leads to a positive "competition e¤ect" that reduces emissions (analogous to the imperfectly-discriminating audit mechanism), but it also leads to a negative "unequal-treatment e¤ect"that leads to increased emissions. Which of the two e¤ects is larger depends on the sign of the third derivative of the bene…t function.
Since the all-pay auction audit mechanism does not necessarily lead to lower emissions, this …nding is a counter-example to the claim in Epstein and Nitzan (2006) that the all-pay auction tends to be the superior mechanism for eliciting aggregate e¤ort in a two player framework.
In the context of this paper aggregate e¤ort is equivalent to the abatement of emissions by …rms. Hence, Epstein and Nitzan's claim does not hold true in the environmental compliance context analyzed in this paper.
Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (2006) state in their footnote 14: "The property of convexity of the …rm's emission with respect to the probability of auditing [..] seems reasonable." We follow this argument, because it makes intuitive sense that the audit probability deters emissions at a decreasing rate given that the …rm reports none of its emissions. It follows that g 000 (e) > 0 for e i 2 [0; E): 18 In this case, the ranking of induced emissions levels is 18 If emissions decrease in a convex manner with an increasing audit probability, the following inequality has to hold:
Recall that the emission level under the random audit mechanism when the agency is underfunded is given by: g 0 (e) = 2 : Di¤erentiating the latter expression twice w.r.t. and solving for unambiguously: e t < e r < e a ; for B 2 (0; 2);
where e t and e r are the induced per-…rm emission levels under the Tullock audit mechanism and the random audit mechanism respectively, and e a is the expected per-…rm emission level under the all-pay auction audit mechanism.
Figure (4) illustrates this …nding. It is shown that if the agency is underfunded (B 2 (0; 2))
the ranking of emission levels resulting from the three audit mechanism is e t < e r < e a : If the agency is fully funded (B 2) all three audit mechanisms lead to the full-compliance emission level e f c : In other words, if the agency applies some competition in reporting when allocating audit resources, welfare is increased through lower emission levels (e t < e r ). However, too much competition in reporting induces the opposite outcome, namely more emissions under the all-pay auction audit mechanism (e r < e a ). This result holds true if the su¢ cient condition stated above is ful…lled.
yields:
: Since g 00 (e) < 0; it follows that g 000 (e) > 0 in order for emissions to be decreasing in a convex manner in the audit probability.
Concluding Remarks
The goal of this paper is to work towards the design of audit mechanisms that apply the available audit resources more e¤ectively. The analysis resulted in several insights that help to achieve this goal. The main contribution is the comparison of three audit mechanisms in terms of the emission levels they induce among regulated …rms given insu¢ cient audit resources. (1) We prove that the commonly applied random audit mechanism is not optimal when environmental enforcement agencies are underfunded. Thus, an optimal audit mechanism would make use of the reports in some way. (2) We establish that the imperfectlydiscriminating audit mechanism can lead to lower emission levels in comparison to the random audit mechanism given the same amount of audit resources. (3) It is further shown that the perfectly-discriminating audit mechanism leads to higher expected emission levels in comparison to the two other audit mechanisms. In conclusion, the enforcement agency achieves the best results for the environment if it simultaneously: (a) allows the regulated …rms to in ‡u-ence their audit probability to some degree through their reports, and (b) exposes the …rms to some degree of randomness in the audit decision.
Before solid policy advice for improved audit mechanisms can be provided, further research is required. The exact characteristics of the optimal imperfectly-discriminating audit mechanism should be derived. Also, given the paucity of reliable and available …eld data, it would be informative to test whether the qualitative predictions derived from the model introduced in this paper hold true in a laboratory computer experiment as well. If B = 1, the BR1 is de…ned as: r 1 (e 1 ; r 2 ; B) = p Br 2 (r 2 + e 1 ) r 2 , i.e. for large r 2 the BR1 converges to a parallel line somewhere between r 1 = 0 and r 1 = e 1 : If B 2 (1; 2) , the BR1 is de…ned as: Thus, e 1 > 0: If e 1 > 0 and r 2 = 0 then the best response is "; where " is the smallest possible reporting unit. All remaining cases have e 1 > 0; and r 2 > 0:
We derive (22) …rst, i.e. the BR1 when the audit budget is such that B 2 (0; 1]: Evaluating the …rst derivative (9) at r 1 = 0 is proportional to (r 2 + e 1 )B r 2 : Hence, if (r 2 + e 1 )B r 2 < 0 (or r 2 > e 1
) then it is optimal to choose r 1 = 0: Evaluating the …rst derivative (9) at r 1 = e 1 leads to r 2 B e 1 r 2 : If B 1 then this expressions is always less than zero and the inequality r 2 B e 1 r 2 > 0 never holds, i.e. r 1 = e 1 can never be optimal if B 1; regardless of r 2 : In all other cases, the optimal reporting choice is interior, i.e. 0 < r 1 < e 1 and the FOC (9) can be rearranged to r 1 = p r 2 (r 2 + e 1 )B r 2 : We derive (23) next, i.e. the BR1 when the audit budget is such that B > 1: Firm 1's problem is to chose some r 1 2 [0; e 1 ] to maximize: < r 2 ). On this range, pro…t is always equal to E 1 = g(e 1 ) te 1 regardless of the report (0 r 1 e 1 ). Hence, any report equal or below e 1 is a best response -in particular, r 1 = e 1 is a best response. And so e 1 is a best response whenever
We continue to assume that the …rm chooses r 1 = e 1 in case it is indi¤erent between any r 1 2 [0; e 1 ]; such as in the present case (iii). While this assumption simpli…es the analysis, it does not in ‡uence the emission choice of the …rms in equilibrium. Referring to …gure (2), the BRs only intersect once at exactly the same point with or without this assumption. Without this assumption, BR1 becomes a correspondence whenever it crosses the straight line with slope
: To the right of this crossing point, all BR1s are below the straight line; hence, BR1 and BR2 (which is always on or above the straight line) intersect only once at exactly the same point, with or without this assumption.
This concludes the derivation of the BR1. The best response function of …rm 2 can be found equivalently.
Single Crossing Property of the Best Response Functions
We show next, that the BRs only cross exactly once for B 2 (0; 2) and for any e i 2 (0; E] for i = 1; 2. Hence, the reporting equilibrium is unique.
In case p i 2 (p; p); r 1 (e 1 ; r 2 ; B) = Figure 5 : L(e 1 ) and R(e 1 ; e t ) : LHS and RHS of the FOC de…ned in (19) with e 2 …xed at the equilibrium candidate identi…ed in (20) , i.e. e 2 = e t and e 1 varying from 0 to E when B 2 (1; 2). Note, it is 
Su¢ cient Condition for the Existence of e t as Symmetric SPNE
This section works out a su¢ cient condition for the existence of e t de…ned in (20) as a symmetric SPNE in pure strategies. This su¢ cient condition guarantees that e 1 = e 2 = e t is the only stationary point. It is also shown that e 1 = e 2 = e t is a local maximum. If e 1 = e 2 = e t is a local maximum and in addition it is the only stationary point, it follows that it has to be a global maximum. We begin by …xing the emission level of …rm 2 at the equilibrium candidate identi…ed in equation (20), i.e. e 2 = e t and rewrite the FOC (19) as L(e 1 ) = R(e 1 ; e t ); where:
R(e 1 ; e t ) = 1 B
Expression L(e 1 ) represents the marginal bene…t associated with causing emissions and R(e 1 ; e t ) represents the marginal cost of causing emissions (both are divided by constant ). Whenever L(e 1 ) = R(e 1 ; e t ); the FOC holds and indicates a stationary point. Whenever L(e 1 ) intersects R(e 1 ; e t ) from above in a diagram with e 1 on the horizontal axis, a local maximum is identi…ed.
Figure (5) and …gure (6) illustrate the value of L(e 1 ) and R(e 1 ; e t ) for the cases B 2 (0; 1] and B 2 (1; 2) respectively. Speci…cally, the …gures show the value of L(e 1 ) and R(e 1 ; e t ); when Figure 6 : L(e 1 ) and R(e 1 ; e t ) : LHS and RHS of the FOC de…ned in (19) with e 2 …xed at the equilibrium candidate identi…ed in (20) , i.e. e 2 = e t and e 1 varying from 0 to E when B 2 (0; 1]: the emissions of …rm 2 are …xed at the emission level of the equilibrium candidate (e 2 = e t ) and the emissions of …rm 1, e 1 vary from 0 to E on the horizontal axis. It is straight forward to see that L(e 1 ) is decreasing in e 1 , taking on value zero at e 1 = E: In the following, we discuss the value of R(e 1 ; e t ) in both …gures. If the level of underfunding is such that B 2 (1; 2) as in …gure (5), the graph can be partitioned into three scenarios with k 1 and k 2 as levels of emission of …rm 1 as dividing points. The pair of emission levels (e 1 ; e 2 ) = (k 1 ; e t ) leads to truthful reporting for …rm 1 at stage 2 of the game; correspondingly, the pair (k 2 ; e t ) leads to truthful reporting for …rm 2 at stage 2 of the game. Put di¤erently, emission level k 1 leads to audit probability p for …rm 1 and p for …rm 2; emission level k 2 leads to audit probability p for …rm 1 and p for …rm 2. Accordingly, k 1 and k 2 are implicitly de…ned by:
Intuitively, in the …rst scenario (0 e 1 k 1 ) emissions of …rm 1, e 1 are relatively small in comparison to e 2 = e t : Hence, report r 1 also has to be much smaller in comparison to r 2 at the reporting equilibrium. This leads to a concentration of audit resources on …rm 1 making the detection probability for …rm 1 high enough to induce this …rm to truthfully report all its emissions. Truthful reporting means that the marginal costs for …rm 1 are constant for any chosen e 1 . Accordingly, R(e 1 ; e t ) is constant in this …rst scenario. In the second scenario (k 1 < e 1 < k 2 ); emission levels e 1 and e 2 are relatively close together, leading to interior reporting choices for both …rms, i.e. 0 < r i < e i for i = 1; 2: The downwardsloping and convex shape of R(e 1 ; e t ) in this scenario is discussed below. In the third scenario (k 2 e 1 E) the emission level e 1 is large enough to make the detection probability for …rm 2 su¢ ciently high to induce …rm 2 to truthfully report all its emissions. This third scenario only exists if k 2 < E; which might or might not be the case depending on the speci…c form of the bene…t function g(e). Note, for B ! 1 from above, k 2 ! 1; which can be seen from (30).
For B 1 as in …gure (6), the reporting choices are interior throughout, because audit resources are not high enough to induce truthful reporting even if they were solely focused on one …rm.
Next, we discuss the convex downward-sloping shape of R(e 1 ; e t ) in …gure (5) and …gure (6) for interior reporting choices, i.e. (k 1 < e 1 < k 2 ). First it is important to state that R(e 1 ; e t ) is independent of the functional form of the bene…t function, g(e). The value of R(e 1 ; e t ) is solely determined by e 1 ; e 2 ; r 1 ; r 2 ; and B: Second, the two best responses stated in (11) can be combined to the following equation:
From equation (31) we can see that multiplying both e 1 and e 2 by some constant, say p to pe 1 and pe 2 results in the reporting choices to increase by exactly factor p as well to pr 1 and pr 2 : From equations (16) and (17) we can learn that the partial derivatives do not change if evaluated at pe 1 , pe 2 ; and pr 1 and pr 2 : Now it is straight forward to see that the value of R(e 1 ; e t ) does not change either subsequent to this change in emissions and reporting. Hence, R(e 1 ; e t ) is homogenous of degree zero (HOD zero) to equal changes in e 1 and e 2 : Third, if we …x e 2 at any level of emissions and let e 1 vary from 0 to E, the shape of R(e 1 ; e t ) on the interval e 2 (k 1 ; minfk 2 ; Eg) is revealed in its general form, because R(e 1 ; e t ) is HOD zero. In the example illustrated in …gure (7) we …xed the emission level of …rm 2 at the equilibrium candidate, i.e. e 2 = e t : This example reveals the convex downward-sloping shape of R(e 1 ; e t ) in …gure (5) and …gure (6) .
With the help of the partial derivatives of the reporting equilibrium stated in (26), we can …nd the values for R(e 1 ; e t ) to conclude …gure (5) and …gure (6):
R(e 1 ; e t )
Whenever L(e 1 ) intersects R(e 1 ; e t ) from above, a local maximum is identi…ed. Whenever this local maximum is the only stationary point, it has to be a global maximum. A su¢ cient condition that guarantees that L(e 1 ) intersects R(e 1 ; e t ) uniquely from above as illustrated in …gure (5) and …gure (6) is stated next:
Su¢ cient condition for the existence of ( e t ; e t ) as symmetric pure strategy SPNE: There exists some m > 0 such that if jg 00 (e 1 )j > m for all e 2 [0 minfk 2 ; Eg]; then a symmetric pure strategy SPNE exists. Figure 7 : Value of L(e 1 ) and R(e 1 ; e t ) as de…ned in (27) and (28) for various funding levels of B; with B = ( )=t. The emission level of …rm 2 e 2 is …xed at the emission level of the equilibrium candidate e t , de…ned in (20) . This example was generated with the bene…t function: g(e) = e 0:5 e:
Put di¤erently, if g 0 (e 1 ) is steep enough on the interval [0; minfk 2 ; Eg], then it is guaranteed that the symmetric SPNE in pure strategies exists.
9 Appendix B (Not Intended for Publication)
Perfectly-discriminating Audit Mechanism
When the regulatory agency announces the competitive parameter to be in…nity large ( ! 1) the audit regime takes the form of the perfectly-discriminating audit mechanism, also referred to as auction audit mechanism in the following. Under an auction audit mechanism, …rms submit their reports (as bids) for which they have to pay taxes. The fact that both …rms pay taxes on their bids gives this game the character of an all-pay auction. The winning …rm in this auction is the one …rm with the higher report. The prize for the winning …rm is that most, if not all audit resources are allocated to the loosing …rm. If the resources available to the agency for audit e¤orts lead to an audit probability for the loosing …rm smaller or equal to t= ; the entire audit resources are focused on the loosing …rm. If the agency has audit resources left over after increasing the audit probability of the loosing …rm to t= ; the remaining audit resources are applied to audit the winning …rm.
With ! 1; the contest success function described in (3) becomes discontinuous. The expected pro…t for …rm 1 is:
where the contest success function for …rm 1 in (32) is:
The probability that contestant 2 wins is p 2 = 1 p 1 : The game is solved by way of backwards induction starting at stage two of the game and focussing attention on symmetric equilibria, since …rms are identical.
Stage 2: The Reporting Equilibrium
In stage two of the game, …rms send reports to the agency in order to minimize payments consisting of (a) tax-payments on reported emissions ( tr i ) and (b) expected …nes on unreported emissions (p i (r i ; r j ) [e i r i ]); for i = 1; 2: The equilibrium in this stage will be a reporting function for each of the …rms (r 1 (e 1 ; e 2 ) and r 2 (e 1 ; e 2 )) that depends on the levels of emission chosen by both …rms at stage 1 of the game without any incentives to deviate for either player. In case the audit budget is such that 1 < B < 2; the reporting equilibrium is in pure strategies. 19 In case B < 1; the reporting equilibrium is in mixed strategies. The following two Lemmas state the NE of the reporting game at stage 2 under the auction audit mechanism. Lemma 3 Given the funding level of the agency is 1 < B < 2 and e 1 e 2 ; in the unique Nash Equilibrium …rm 2 reports truthfully its emission level, i.e. r 2 = e 2 : Firm 1 chooses r 1 = e 2 :
20
Proof. We will prove Lemma 3 by showing that there is no incentive to deviate from the Nash Equilibrium r 1 = r 2 = e 2 for neither one of the …rms, if e 1 e 2 . Consider …rm 2 …rst. Firm 2 loses the audit-auction and attracts all audit-resources. Reporting r 2 = e 2 leads to payo¤ te 2 : Deviating from this choice of reporting to a smaller report (r 2 < r 2 ) leads to losing the auction and to payo¤ tr 2 [e 2 r 2 ]: In this case, …rm 2 would save tax payments of value t[e 2 r 2 ] and incurs additional expected penalties for unreported emissions of value [e 2 r 2 ]: Since > t the agency sets = t for …rm 2, so that this deviation is not pro…table. Upward deviations result in wining the audit auction and result in payo¤ tr 2 : Since r 2 > e 2 this deviation is not pro…table either.
Consider …rm 1 next. Firm 1 has decided to choose a higher amount of emission at stage 1 of the game in comparison to …rm 2, i.e. e 1 > e 2 : Reporting r 1 = e 2 leads to payo¤ te 2 ( t= ) (e 1 e 2 ) and to winning the audit-auction. This payo¤ consists of the tax payments for reporting r 1 = e 2 and in addition the expected penalty. The expected penalty occurs because the agency allocates not more audit resources to …rm 2 than required to guarantee truth-telling, that is p 2 (r 1 ; r 2 ) = t= : The remaining audit resources ( t= ) are allocated to audit …rm 1, i.e. p 1 (r 1 ; r 2 ) = t= : Deviating from this choice of reporting to a smaller report (r 1 < r 1 ), leads to losing the auction and to payo¤ tr 1 [e 1 r 1 ]: The agency will set p 1 (r 1 ; r 2 ) = t= ; so that the loosing payo¤ is tr 1 t[e 1 r 1 ] = te 1 : So this new payo¤ is lower in comparison to before. Hence, the downward-deviation is not pro…table for …rm 1. If …rm 1 deviates upward (r 1 > r 1 ) this too would not be bene…cial, because the …rm would only incur extra costs of t[r 1 e 2 ] without receiving any extra bene…t, because …rm 1 wins the audit-auction in either case. Since there is no pro…table deviation for either …rm, r 1 = r 2 = e 2 has to be a NE.
This NE is also unique. In order to prove this, let us consider the situation when both …rms report zero, that is r 1 = r 2 = 0: The auction is tied and …rm 2 would attract all audit resources per assumption. Expected payo¤ of …rm 2 would be te 2 : Now increasing reporting slightly to r 2 > 0; leads to more pro…t for …rm 2. Reporting a very small amount, say r 2 = "; leads to payo¤ t" ( t= ) (e 2 ") or t" ( t)(e 2 "); because …rm 2 would now win the auction. Since this new payo¤ is higher in comparison to before, it is bene…cial for …rm 2 to increase its report to r 2 > 0:
Given the report of …rm 2 being r 2 > 0; …rm 1 loses the auction and attracts the full amount of audit resources leading to an expected payo¤ of te 1 : In contrast, bidding the same as …rm 2 leads to a higher expected payo¤ for …rm 1. Hence, both …rms want to win the audit-auction and increase their reports as long as r i < e i : Concluding, there exists no equilibrium for r i < e 2 ; for i = 1; 2:
The Lemma shows that …rm 1 always wins the audit auction, while …rm 2 always looses the audit auction, if e 1 > e 2 . While the audit budget is su¢ ciently high to induce …rm 2 to report truthful all its emissions created at stage 1 of the game, both …rms report the identical emission level of the lower emitting …rm 2. If e 1 = e 2 ; both …rms truthfully report their emissions.
Lemma 4 Given B
1 and e 1 e 2 , the NE of the reporting game at stage 2 is in mixed strategies. These strategies are described by players' cumulative distribution functions (cdfs) that describe the distribution of reporting choices according to: Proof. Consider …rst the situation when both …rms report zero, that is r 1 = r 2 = 0 and e 2 < e 1 : The audit-auction is tied and …rm 2 attracts all audit resources. Expected payo¤ of …rm 2 is (e 2 ): Now, increasing reporting to r 2 > 0; leads to more pro…t for …rm 2. Reporting a very small amount of emissions, say r 2 = "; leads to payo¤ t"; because …rm 2 would now win the auction. Since " is very small, it is bene…cial for …rm 2 to increase its report to r 2 = ": Given …rm 2 reports r 2 > 0; …rm 1 loses the auction and attracts the full amount of audit resources leading to an expected payo¤ of (e 1 ): Bidding the same amount as …rm 2 in contrast leads to a higher expected payo¤ for …rm 1 of tr 1 ; where r 1 = r 2 = ": Following this rationale, it is bene…cial for each of the …rms to overbid the other …rm in terms of reporting as long as:
When …rms compete in their reports, expression (36) becomes …rst binding for the …rm with the lower emissions, …rm 2 such that tr 2 = e 2 : Given both …rms report according to (36), …rm 2 loses the audit auction and it's payo¤ becomes: e 2 (e 2 t e 2 ): This payo¤ is lower in comparison to the situation when …rm 2 reports r 2 = 0 and loses the auction. Hence, the equilibrium has to be in mixed strategies. In fact, r 2 = 0 is the lower limit of reasonable reporting, because any other 0 < r 2 < t e 2 would lead to loosing the auction anyway (given that r 1 = t e 2 ) and to some additional tax payments for …rm 2.
As shown in equation (36), the maximum report …rm 2 would send is de…ned by tr 2 = e 2 (or r 2 = t e 2 ). But if …rm 2 never reports more than r 2 = t e 2 ; then …rm 1 can be sure of winning with probability one if it reports r 1 = t e 2 . This de…nes the upper limit of reasonable reporting and reduces the interval wherein both players randomize to r i 2 [0; t e 2 ] (or r i 2 [0; e 2 B]; where B = t ); for i = 1; 2:
The cost of …rm 1 for reporting r 1 = t e 2 and to win the audit-auction with certainty is tr 1 = e 2 : In fact, this is …rm 1's equilibrium payo¤, i.e. in any equilibrium in mixed strategies, …rm 1 would only be willing to mix between its actions if this strategy leads to the same expected payo¤ of e 2 : We analyze next the expected payo¤ of …rm 1. The expected payo¤ of …rm 1, can be stated as:
The equilibrium cdf in (35) can be obtained by setting equal this expected payo¤ to the equilibrium payo¤ and solve this expression for the probability of winning:
Equilibrium payo¤ (1) = Expected payo¤ (1) e 2 = P (r 2 r 1 )( tr 1 ) + (1 P (r 2 r 1 ))( tr 1 (e 1 r 1 )) P (r 2 r 2 ) = r 1 (t ) + (e 1 e 2 ) (e 1 r 1 )
Probability P (r 2 r 1 ) expressed above de…nes the mixed strategy of the reporting choices for …rm 2 that keeps …rm 1 indi¤erent between any of its choices r 1 2 [0; e 2 B]: This expression can be transformed to the equilibrium cdf in expression (35), where B = =t.
The cdf of player 1's strategy can be found with the help of the expected payo¤ of …rm 2. The expected payo¤ of …rm 2, can be stated as:
Firm 2 can always obtain some payo¤ with certainty simply by bidding r 2 = 0 and losing the audit auction. Doing so leads to a payo¤ for …rm 2 of: e 2 . Indeed, this is …rm 2's equilibrium payo¤. Note, that the equilibrium payo¤s in stage 2 of the game for …rm 1 and for …rm 2 are identical.
Firm 2 is only willing to mix between some of its actions if this behavior leads to the same expected payo¤. Setting equal the expected payo¤ of …rm 2 to its equilibrium payo¤ yields:
Expected payo¤ e 2 = P (r 1 r 2 )( tr 2 ) + (1 P (r 1 r 2 ))( tr 2 (e 2 r 2 )) P (r 1 r 1 ) = r 2 (t ) (e 2 r 2 ) (37) Probability P (r 1 r 1 ) de…ned in (37) de…nes the mixed strategy of …rm 1 that keeps …rm 2 indi¤erent between any of its choices r 2 2 [0; e 2 B]: (37) can be transformed to (34), with B = =t.
The cdfs in (34) and (35) de…ne mixed strategies for both players, so that none of the players have incentives to deviate from their strategy. Note, that the strategy pro…le of …rm 2 has a mass point at:
e 1 e 2 e 1 This mass point de…nes the positive probability that …rm 2 assigns to choosing to report zero, in order to keep …rm 1 indi¤erent between its choices (assuming e 1 e 2 ).
The most important …ndings from this section for the following analysis are the expected payo¤s of both …rms in the NE. The expected costs for both …rms are e 2 in case B 1 and e 2 e 1 : In case 1 < B < 2, the loosing …rm 2 pays the full amount of taxes required for its emissions, te 2 : The winning …rm 1 pays taxes for its report, te 2 ; and in addition it pays an expected penalty on its undisclosed emissions. The expected penalty occurs, because the agency allocates not more audit resources to …rm 2 than required to guarantee truth-telling, that is p 2 (r 1 ; r 2 ) = t= : The remaining audit resources ( t= ) are allocated to audit …rm 1, i.e. p 1 (r 1 ; r 2 ) = t= : Hence, the expected payments of the winning …rm 1 are: te 2 + ( t= ) (e 1 e 2 ): The latter expression can be simpli…ed to: e 1 ( t) + e 2 (2t ): With this insight we can determine the NE in terms of emissions choices at stage 1 of the game.
Stage 1: The Emissions Equilibrium
In stage one of the game, …rms choose their levels of emission e 1 and e 2 ; in order to maximize expected pro…ts given the audit regime takes the form of an auction audit mechanism. Thereby, both …rms take into consideration how their individual choices of emissions in ‡u-ences both their own and the other …rm's equilibrium report in stage 2 of the game. The equilibrium at stage 1 is an emissions-strategy for each of the …rms that maximizes expected pro…ts given the other …rm's choice of emission.
Recall, that from the analysis of stage 2 of the game it is known that the expected payo¤ for both …rms is e 2 ; if e 1 e 2 in case B 1. In case 1 < B < 2, …rm 1 expects to pay: e 1 ( t) + e 2 (2t ) and …rm 2 expects to pay te 2 : There is no symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. Any choice of e 1 = e 2 is dominated by deviating upwards for both …rms. In order to see this consider …rm 1 at e 1 = e 2 < E: From the analysis at stage 2 of the game we know that the expected payments at stage 2 would be te i in case 1 < B < 2, and e i in case B
1. The marginal costs of causing emissions is t and respectively. Deviating upwards leads to winning the audit auction and to marginal costs of the additional units of emissions of ( t= ) and zero respectively. Hence, deviating upwards is bene…cial for …rm 1 until e 1 = E: The best response to this emission choice of …rm 1 would be to choose e 2 = e f c if 1 < B < 2 or e 2 = e if B 1, where e f c is implicitly de…ned by g 0 (e f c ) = t and e is implicitly de…ned by g 0 (e ) = : The resulting pair of emission choices of …rm 1 and …rm 2 describe one asymmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. Clearly, it could also be possible that e 2 = E and e 1 = e f c or e 1 = e depending on which of the two latter expressions is lower. Which one of the two equilibria is played is not clear, because that depends on how the …rms coordinate their actions. Since …rms are identical, we prefer to focus on the symmetric equilibrium, which is in mixed strategies in the current problem as shown above. 21 Let f (e i ) denote the probability density function (pdf) and F (e i ) denote the cumulative distribution function (cdf) that describe the distribution of emission choices of …rm i; for i = 1; 2: The probability of …rm 2 choosing lower emissions in comparison to …rm 1, and subsequently …rm 1 winning the audit auction is
f (e 2 )de 2 : The probability of …rm 2 choosing higher emissions in comparison to …rm 1, and subsequently …rm 1 loosing the audit auction
f (e 2 )de 2 : Concluding, the expected pro…t of …rm 1 at stage 1 of the game is:
(38) Simplifying the expected pro…t of …rm 1 in (38) gives:
Firm 1 chooses its level of e 1 given the emission level of …rm 2, e 2 in order to maximize the expected pro…t in (39). The …rst-order condition is: @E 1 (e 1 ; e 2 ) @e 1 = g 0 (e 1 ) (1 F (e 1 )) = 0 if 0 t g 0 (e 1 ) + (2t )F (e 1 ) t = 0 if t < < 2t
Solving the …rst-order condition in (40) for F (e 1 ) leads to the equilibrium emission level for both …rms, since F (e) is identical for both …rms. The equilibrium cdf is stated in the next Proposition divided up into the two funding situations of the agency as before.
Proposition 5
If the agency announces the perfectly discriminating (auction) audit mechanism, the symmetric equilibrium is in mixed strategies and can be described by the equilibrium cdfs of player's strategies: 
where e f c is implicitly de…ned by g 0 (e f c ) = t; e by g 0 (e ) = ; and e t by g 0 (e t ) = t:
Proof. The derivation of F (e) is so far only heuristic, because (40) is merely a necessary condition. We show next that F (e) is optimal against any possible deviation of e; which is a su¢ cient condition. Plugging F (e) into (39) gives the expected pro…t for …rm 1 applying the equilibrium mixed strategy. This pro…t level is:
E 1 (F (e); F (e)) = g(e ) e if 0 t g(e f c ) te
Any deviation from F (e) to any other e 1 = 2 [e ; E] if 0 < t; or equivalently to any other e 1 =
2 [e f c ; E] if t < < 2t leads not to a higher level of pro…t and is hence not a pro…table deviation. In order to see this, let …rm 1 deviate to b e; where b e < maxfe ; e f c g: The audit-auction would be lost with certainty given that …rm 2 randomizes its emissions according to F (e): If the audit-auction is lost, …rm 1 faces marginal cost of if 0 t and of t if t < < 2t. The emission levels e and e f c are the two optimal choices when the …rm faces the afore-mentioned marginal costs ( and t). Hence, b e < maxfe ; e f c g cannot be optimal. Accordingly, any b e > E cannot be optimal either. Note, g 0 (e) < 0 for e 2 (E; 1):
The cdfs de…ned in (41) describe the mixed strategy of both …rms that keeps the other …rm indi¤erent between any of its emission choices for the two funding cases. Concluding, in stage 1, the …rm faces a trade-o¤. Higher emissions leads to both an increase in revenue (through g(e)), but also an increase in costs, where the latter is determined endogenously by the other …rm's behavior. If …rm 1 increases its emissions, e 1 , its costs increase only if e 1 < e 2 , i.e. if …rm 1 would have lost the audit-auction anyway. So, to ensure …rm 1 is indi¤erent between the emissions levels over which it is supposed to bene…t, there must be a balance between increased revenue and increased costs. This is what (40) says.
The expected emission level for both …rms under an auction audit mechanism e a are given by: 
Ranking of Induced Emission Levels
In this section we compare and rank the amount of emissions caused by …rms in equilibrium under each of the three audit mechanisms. The expressions that implicitly de…ne the emission level under the random audit mechanism, e r in equation (7), the Tullock audit mechanism, e t in equation (20) , and the expected emissions under the auction audit mechanism, e a in equation (41) 
Proposition 2 states that e r > e t whenever the agency is underfunded (0 B 2) and the su¢ cient condition for the existence for the equilibrium holds (g 0 (e) is steep). The next question of interest is how e a compares to e r and to e t : Comparing the RHS of the equations stated in (43) reveals the answer. The following proposition summarizes the result:
Proposition 6 Given a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies exists for the Tullock audit mechanism (as per su¢ cient conditions stated above), and if the bene…t function is such that g 000 (e) > 0 for all e; then the ranking of induced emission levels is: e t < e r < e a :
If g 000 (e) < 0 for all e; then the ranking is: e t < e r ; and e a < e r ; and e a ? e r :
Proof. Note, the higher the values on the right hand side (RHS) of the equations stated in (43), the lower the induced emission level and vice versa, because g(e) is concave in e for e 2 [0; E): We begin with the comparison of e a and e r for the case 0 B 1: Emission level e a de…ned in (42) is the expected emission level, or the mean of the distribution represented through its cdf stated in (41). Hence, 1 F (e a ) is the probability that one realization of the distribution in (41) exceeds the mean emission level e a : In addition, we know that for any continuos distribution, the probability of not exceeding the median of this distribution equals 1=2, i.e. F (e m ) = 1=2; or 1 F (e m ) = 1=2; where e m is the median emission level of distribution F (e). Hence, we …nd that e m = e r : That means, whether the auction audit mechanism induces higher or lower emission levels in comparison to the random audit mechanism depends on how the mean of distribution F (e) compares to its median. Since F (e a ) is monotonically increasing in e for 0 < F (e) < 1; it has to be true that e a > e r if (1 F (e a )) < and vice versa. Recall, that the cdf of the distribution is F (e) = 1 g 0 (e)=( ); and the pdf is f (e) = g 00 (e)=( ): Concluding, there are more emissions under the auction audit mechanism, if the mean of the distribution is greater than the median and vice versa.
A su¢ cient condition to guarantee that the auction audit mechanism leads to greater emissions than the random audit mechanism is g 000 (e) > 0: If g 000 (e) > 0; F (e) is concave. If F (e) is concave, the van Zwet condition is ful…lled such that F (e m x) + F (e m + x) 1 for all x: If a cdf ful…lls this condition and we can in addition exclude that e = e m , then it follows that e > e m ; where e m is the median and e is the mean emission level of the distribution (van Zwet (1979)).
If g 000 (e) > 0, it is 1 F (e a ) < 0:5 and the auction audit mechanism induces higher emission levels in comparison to the random audit mechanism in the case 0 B 1: If g 000 (e) < 0; the reverse is true. We continue the comparison of e a and e r for the case when 1 < B < 2: Comparing the RHS of the relevant equations of system (43) gives:
Inequality (44) is equivalent to 1=2 7 F (e a ): Following the rational applied above for the case 0 B 1 leads to the conclusion that the auction audit mechanism induces higher emission levels in comparison to the random audit mechanism also for the case 1 < B < 2:
If e a > e r and e r > e t ; it has to be true that e a > e t : If g 000 (e) < 0 for all e; the ranking of e a and e t is ambivalent. Examples for e a > e t can be found as well as for e a < e t .
